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Abstract
In the event of a job termination, many workers receive severance
payments from their employer, in addition to publicly provided un-
employment insurance (UI). In the absence of a third party enforcer,
contracts featuring severance payments must be supported by an im-
plicit self-enforcing contract. Workers believe employers will make
severance payments only if it is in their best interest ex post. If firms
discount the future deeply, they will reduce the severance payment
they offer, in order to relax their incentive constraint. Workers are
forced to bear risk, and too many workers are laid off. We show that
a well-designed public UI system can correct these distortions.
1. Introduction
Being fired is a very costly incident for many workers. Accordingly, unem-
ployment insurance(UI) can improve welfare by partially smoothing the in-
come streams of risk adverse workers. In the event of a job termination, most
workers are eligible for publicly provided UI. However, a sizable proportion
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2of workers also receive insurance from their employer.1 When workers and
firms sign contracts that include a severance payment, they have a means to
further smooth workers’ income between periods of employment and un-
employment. Unfortunately, these contracts are typically difficult to enforce.
McLeod and Malcomson (1989) and Carmichael (1983) have illustrated that,
because it is difficult for a third party to observe who initiated a job separation,
severance payments must be supported by a self-enforcing contract. Consider
a firm that wishes to reduce its work force. If the firm was to honor its con-
tracts, it would have to make severance payments to the terminated workers.
A cheaper alternative for the firm would be to put pressure on the employees
to quit, in which case no severance payments must be made. This implies that
workers will only accept a contract that is self-enforcing for the firm. Firms
will find it in their best interest to make severance payments if they extract
sizable rents from their workers. If this is the case, then not honoring their
contracts jeopardizes this stream of future profits.2
In the absence of publicly provided UI, we demonstrate that the equilib-
rium level of severance payment can be inefficiently low. If a firm discounts
the future sufficiently deeply, it will not be able to commit to providing their
workers with full insurance. Thus, firms will reduce the amount of insurance
they offer in order to be able to commit to making the payment. However,
partial insurance implies that risk averse workers are forced to bear risk. Fur-
ther, firms will not face the social cost associated with laying off workers, and
consequentially lay off too many workers. Much of our analysis of publicly pro-
vided UI will be done in this second-best world, where firms cannot commit
to providing their workers with full insurance.
It is well recognized in the literature that publicly provided UI programs
can have a negative impact on employment. In this paper, we show that a well-
designed public provision of UI can improve the efficiency of the economy.
The existence of publicly provided UI reduces the need for firms to provide
insurance to their workers. As the size of the severance payment shrinks, the
firm’s commitment problem associated with making the payment diminishes.
Thus, public provision of UI can reduce both layoffs and the volatility of the
1In the US, 36% of all full-time employees of the large and medium private establishments
receive severance payments, while 15% of all full-time employees of the small private estab-
lishments receive severance payments. The same numbers for professional technical-related
employees are 48% and 23%, respectively.
2There are some similarities between this paper and Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994).
Medieval kings faced a commitment problem, when it came to protecting the property
rights of visiting merchants. A king could reap an immediate benefit by confiscating the
goods of a visiting merchant. Kings overcame this commitment problem by encouraging
the formation of trade guilds, which lessened the degree of competition between mer-
chants. This distortion in trade allowed kings to commit to protecting the rights of visiting
merchants. Similarly, in this paper firms lessen their commitment problem by reducing the
size of their severance payments, creating a distortion in the economy that leads to partial
insurance.
3workers’ income. Of course, UI programs can introduce distortions of their
own. Unemployment benefits subsidize layoffs, making layoffs more attractive
to the firm. A conventional way to correct this problem is to introduce an
experience rating in the way the system is financed.3 Experience rating forces
firms to internalize part of the subsidy provided by unemployment benefits,
and consequently reduces the distortion in layoff decisions. We demonstrate
that publicly provided UI, featuring a high experience rating can improve the
efficiency of an economy. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we present an overview of the model. In Section 3, we analyze
the equilibrium, both when contracts are enforceable, and when they are not.
Publicly provided UI is discussed in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5. All
proofs are given in the Appendix.
2. The Model
The economy is composed of an infinite number of successive generations.
Each generation lives for two periods. M workers are born at the beginning of
each generation and live for two periods. We call the workers young in their
first period of life, and old in their second period. Workers are risk averse,
do not have access to financial markets, and do not discount the future.
The per period, twice continuously differentiable utility function is given by
U = U (W + R) where W is outside income and R is home production. This
home production takes a value of zero if the worker is working, and a value
of r if the worker is unemployed. It is also assumed that U ′ ≥ 0 and U ′′ ≤ 0.
The first sector of the two-sector economy, denoted sector 1, is composed
of a large number of infinitely lived identical firms that are not exposed
to productivity shocks. It is assumed that firms in this sector have constant
returns to scale and act competitively. Worker productivity per period is given
by x where x > r . It is assumed that workers who accept jobs in the other
sector cannot move back to sector 1 if they are laid off.4
The other sector denoted sector 2 is composed of K identical firms that
are infinitely lived. Firms discount each generation at a rate of δ, but do not
discount within a generation. Firms take prices as given and are risk neutral.
The output price is normalized to one. In the first period of each generation,
the production function is F [N ] where N is the number of workers working
for the firm. It is assumed that F ′ > 0 and F ′′ < 0. However, in the second
period, all firms in sector 2 experience a negative productivity shock, resulting
in the production function pF [n] where p < 1.5
3Topel and Welch (1980) have a good survey on the topic.
4It is not essential that laid-off workers stay unemployed: as long as there is enough friction
that workers cannot instantaneously find a new job, we would be able to derive similar
results.
5We assume that the probability of the shock is one, introducing the possibility of no shock
will not change the nature of the results.
4We assume that it is impossible for the courts to observe which party ini-
tiates a job separation. Either party can take hidden actions to induce the
other party to initiate the separation. This implies that contracts involving
separation payments are not enforceable by a third party.6 However, we as-
sume that young workers know if, in the past, a firm agreed to pay a severance
payment, and did not fulfill its obligation.7 The equilibrium contract obvi-
ously depends on the young workers’ beliefs about whether the firm will make
severance payments, given the firm’s history. The equilibrium concept used
is Perfect Baysian Equilibrium. We assume that young workers believe that
firms that did not pay a severance payment in the past will not pay them in the
future. In this scenario, the strongest possible punishment is used, meaning
that workers never accept a contract featuring a severance payment if the firm
has defaulted in the past.8
2.1. Sequence of Events
Each one of the infinite number of generations is composed of two periods.
At the beginning of the first period each firm in sector 2 offers long-term con-
tracts to N young workers. The contracts stipulate a wage for the first period
w y , a wage for the second period wo and a severance payment s for the laid-off
workers. Workers have to choose whether to accept the offer or to work in sec-
tor 1 at a wage x per period. Production takes place, and then wages and taxes
are paid. At the beginning of the second period, firms in sector 2 experience
a negative productivity shock, resulting in the production function p F (n)
where p < 1. We denote n as the number of workers retained by a sector 2
firm after the productivity shock occurs. Next, the firms decide whether to
pay the severance payments or not. Laid-off workers receive the value of their
home production. Finally, production takes place and UI benefits, wages, and
taxes are paid. The sequence is then repeated for all generations.
3. Equilibrium with Full Commitment
To serve as a benchmark, we begin by assuming that contracts featuring sev-
erance payments are enforceable by the courts. For each generation, firms
6Macloed and Malcomson (1989) and Carmichael (1983) used the same type of argument.
7Workers within a firm are assumed to be able to observe the reason for a separation; they
are able to see the difference between a worker who quits and one who quits because the
firm pressured the worker to leave.
8This is one of many possible beliefs the workers could have and it is important to acknowl-
edge that this equilibrium is not unique; different beliefs will lead to different equilibria.
However, this assumption is standard in the literature on optimal labor contracts, such as
Thomas and Worrall (1988). Moreover, it generates the same qualitative results as a wide
variety of more complicated beliefs. For example, if we were to assume that the punish-
ment only lasted for x periods, firms would find it even more difficult to commit to making
severance payments.
5in sector 2 decide the terms of their labor contracts, how many workers to
hire, and how many workers to layoff. In order to solve the firm’s problem
we first determine the optimal lay-off rule, taking as given the number of em-
ployees and the wage contracts. Because of the productivity shock (p), firms
will only keep n workers, and lay off N − n workers. The firm maximizes
pF [n] − wo n − s(N − n) by choosing n. The number of workers retained
n(wo , s) solves pF ′[n(wo , s)] = wo − s .
Given the layoff rule and the long-term contract, firms in sector 2 have
to choose how many workers to hire. The firm maximizes F [N ] − w y N +
pF [n(wo , s)] − wo n(wo , s) − s[N − n(wo , s)] by choosing N . Firms will hire
N (w y , s) workers, which solves F ′[N (w y , s)] = w y + s . It is important to no-
tice that Ns (w y , s) − ns (wo , s) < 0 where Ns is the derivative of N (w y , s) with
respect to s, so when severance payments increase, the number of workers
laid off by a firm decreases. Using the solutions to the two previous problems,
we can define the profit function π(w y , wo , s) as
π(w y , wo , s) = F [N (w y , s)] − w y N (w y , s)
+ pF [n(wo , s)] − wo n(wo , s) − s[N (w y , s) − n(wo , s)].
The total cost of the severance payments paid by firm i is given by [N (w y , s) −
n(wo , s)]s . The impact of a change in s on the total severance payment made
by a firm is given by [Ns (w y , s) − ns (wo , s)]s + [N (w y , s) − n(wo , s)]. When
s increases by one unit, the direct impact leads to an increase in the total
cost equal to the number of workers that are laid off. However, Ns (w y , s) −
ns (wo , s) < 0, thus the sign of the expression is uncertain.
ASSUMPTION 1: We will assume that ∂[N (w y ,s) − n(wo ,s)]
∂s
s
[N (w y ,s) − n(wo ,s)] > −1 for
every value of s between zero and full insurance.
Assumption 1 says that the elasticity of the number of layoffs with respect
with changes in s has to be less that one in absolute value. If this was not
the case, the firm could lower the total cost of the severance payment by
increasing the size of the severance payments.
We now solve for the contract {w y , wo , s} that will be offered by firms to
workers. Every worker can choose to work in sector 1 for a wage of x for two
periods, giving them a lifetime utility of 2U (x). On the other hand, if a worker
accepts a long-term contract in sector 2, the worker receives w y for the first
period and wo for the second period, if the worker is not laid off. However,
because of the productivity shock in the second period, firms will lay off some
workers. Because all workers have the same productivity, the probability of a
worker being laid-off is simply N (w y ,s) − n(wo ,s)N (w y ,s) . The participation constraint is
U (w y ) + n(wo , s)N (w y , s)U (wo ) +
N (w y , s) − n(wo , s)
N (w y , s)
U (r + s) ≥ 2U (x).
6Firms offer workers a contract that maximizes the firm’s expected profit,
subject to the worker’s participation constraint.9 For future reference we will
call this contract type I.
LEMMA 1: When severance payments are enforceable, firms fully insure workers by
offering a long term contract where w 	y = w 	o = x and s 	 = x − r .
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward. Since workers are risk
averse, it is optimal for firms in sector 2 to fully insure workers. Given this con-
tract, the number of workers retained n	 is given by pF ′[n	] = r . The number
of workers hired N 	 is given by F ′[N ] = 2x − r . The per-period profits under
this contract are
π	 = F [N 	] − xN 	 + pF [n	] − xn	 − (x − r )[N 	 − n	].
Under this contract, there is no need for an unemployment insurance system
since workers are fully insured, and hiring and layoff decisions are socially
efficient. All traditional results about unemployment insurance and experi-
ence rating follow.
4. Equilibrium without Full Commitment
Consider the full insurance wage contract labeled I. If contracts featuring
severance payments are not enforceable by the courts, then firms in sector 2
would face a tradeoff when deciding whether or not to make the severance
payments. At any generation t, a firm could default on the payment, and
gain [N 	 − n	](x − r ). However, there is a cost associated with defaulting. In
subsequent generations, workers will doubt the credibility of a wage contract
featuring a severance payment. In order to simplify matters, we assume that
workers hold the belief that if the firm chose to default on a severance pay-
ment in the past, it will always default in the future. Thus, workers will not
be willing to accept a wage contract featuring a positive severance payment
from the firm. However, even if workers do not trust a firm to make severance
payments, they will be willing to work for the firm if it offers a pure wage con-
tract that satisfies the worker’s participation constraint. Pure wage contracts
are assumed to be enforceable by the courts. A firm offering a pure wage
contract would maximize
πp w = F [N (w y )] − w y N (w y ) + pF [n(wo )] − wo n(wo ),
9By doing so we implicitly assume that there is a very large number of workers and a relatively
smaller number of jobs in sector 2, so the bargaining power is all in the hands of the firm in
sector 2. Obviously this is not the only possible labor market structure; in particular we could
introduce bargaining over wages with different bargaining power. In such an environment,
the participation constraint will be more difficult to satisfy and workers would achieve a
higher level of utility. However, the incentive side of the problem, and the need to provide
insurance, will remain present generating similar results.
7subject to the participation constraint
U (w y ) + n(wo )N (w y )U (wo ) +
N (w y ) − n(wo )
N (w y )
U (r ) ≥ 2U (x).
Note that this maximization problem is identical to the maximization problem
when severance payments were enforceable, but with an additional “lack of
credibility” constraint, s = 0. Maximization and substitution yields
π	p w = F
[
N 	p w
] − xN 	p w + pF [n	p w ] − xn	p w .
The “lack of credibility” constraint is binding because workers are risk averse,
implying that π	 > π	p w . Thus, if the firm defaults on the severance payment,
it sacrifices π	 − π	p w in each of the subsequent generations. For a given
discount factor δ, the cost of not making a severance payment is given by
δ
1 − δ (π
	 − π	p w ). Firms will pay severance payment only if δ ≥ δ¯ where
δ¯ = [N
	 − n	](x − r )
[N 	 − n	](x − r ) + π	 − π	p w
and where δ¯ ∈ [0, 1]. When the firm’s discount factor in sector 2 is suffi-
ciently large (δ ≥ δ¯), publicly provided UI is not needed because firms offer
a full insurance contract and they can commit to making the payments. Con-
versely, when the discount factor is too low, a full insurance contract is not
self-enforcing for the firms. In such a case, firms will be constrained in how
much insurance they can offer their workers and still be able to commit to
making the payments. We denote {w IIy , w IIo , s II} to be the self-enforcing equi-
librium contract. This equilibrium contract can be solved the same way as
contract with full commitment (called type I), but with the addition of one
further constraint δ1 − δ (π(w y , wo , s) − π	p w ) ≥ [N (w y , s) − n(wo , s)]s . Firms
offer a contract that maximizes their profits, subject to the participation con-
straint of the workers and the incentive constraint of the firm. The firm’s
problem is the following:
max
{w y ,wo ,s}
{F [N (w y , s)] − w y N (w y , s) + pF [n(wo , s)] − wo n(wo , s)
− s[N (w y , s) − n(wo , s)]},
subject to: δ1 − δ (π(w
II
y , w
II
o , s
II) − π	p w ) ≥ [N (w y , s) − n(wo , s)]s , and
8U (w y ) + n(wo , s)N (w y , s)U (wo ) +
N (w y , s) − n(wo , s)
N (w y , s)
U (r + s) ≥ 2U (x).
Under this type of contract, which we will call type II, the number of workers
hired is given by N II = N (w IIy , s II) and the number of workers retained is
given by nII = n(w IIo , s II).
LEMMA 2: If a firm’s discount factor is lower than δ¯ and Assumption 1 is satisfied,
then the firm will not fully insure workers (w IIo > r + s II).
Firms do not offer full insurance because it would be too tempting for
them to default on their severance payments. Firms provide the maximum
amount of insurance that they can credibly commit to paying.10
When contracts fully insure workers, then w 	o = s 	 + r . In such a case, the
number of workers retained by the firm is given by pF ′(n) = wo − s = r . Un-
der the type II contract w IIo > s
II + r , and the number of workers retained nII
is determined by pF ′(nII) = w IIo − s II > r . Therefore, by concavity of the pro-
duction function we know that nII < n	. Smaller severance payments reduce
the cost of terminating workers, and consequently firms lay-off more workers.
Moreover, because firms need to compensate workers for the diminution in
severance payments, the wages paid to workers are higher. These two factors
combine to induce the firms to retain fewer workers.
On the other hand, the difference in hiring under contracts I and II is
ambiguous. In the “laissez-faire” economy, the full insurance contract of type
I leads to w 	y = s 	 + r = x. The number of workers hired by a firm in sector 2
is given by N 	 where F ′(N 	) = 2x − r . Under the type II contract without full
insurance, w IIy > x and s
II < x − r , and the number of workers hired N II is
given by F ′(N II) = w IIy + s II. Because the production function is concave, we
know that if w IIy + s II < 2x − r , then N II > N 	. Similarly, if w IIy + s II > 2x − r ,
then N II < N 	. The difference depends on the sum of the first period wages
and the severance payment. If the sum is higher than under the full insurance
contract, the firm will hire fewer workers. On the other hand, if the sum is
smaller, the firm will hire more workers.
If the firm’s discount factor is too low to support a full insurance con-
tract, there are two reasons why the introduction of publicly provided UI
can increase efficiency. First, risk averse workers are forced to bear risk. Sec-
ond, both the hiring and layoff decisions are distorted, possibly leaving the
economy with too much unemployment.
10One peculiarity of this self-enforcing contract is that the wage contracts will feature a
decreasing wage profile. Since workers are risk averse, they will want to be compensated
with higher wages. Because a change in first period wages does not increase the probability
of being laid off, workers will prefer to be compensated with a higher wage in the first
period. Data analysis indicates an increasing wage profile. However, the introduction of
general human capital could generate such a wage profile.
95. Optimal Unemployment Insurance Program
The government in this model has access to three tools. The first tool is the
UI benefit (b). In order to finance the benefit, the government can use two
forms of taxation: payroll taxes (τ),11 which are uniform taxes per worker,
and experience rated taxes, with an experience rating of e. The advantage of
using experience rated taxes is that it reduces the layoff distortion associated
with the publicly provided UI benefit. Note that in this model, a UI system
featuring full insurance and an experience rating of 1 will always lead to
a first best outcome. For the remainder of the paper, we concentrate on
government intervention when firms cannot commit to fully insuring their
workers themselves: δ < δ¯.
The government will be required to keep a balanced budget for
each generation.12 Since the government expenditure is [N − n]bK , the
per-generation government budget constraint is given by [N − n]bK =
2τ(M − kN ) + τKN + τnK + e[N − n]bK . The right-hand side of the equal-
ity is the tax revenue. The first term is the payroll tax in sector one. The second
and third terms are the payroll taxes for workers in sector two on young work-
ers and old retained workers, respectively. The final term is the experience
rated component. Note that under a full experience rating system (e = 1),
the payroll taxes will be equal to zero.
Before looking at government intervention we need to understand the
sources of inefficiency in the “laissez-faire” economy when δ < δ¯. In the ab-
sence of government intervention, firms will offer their workers type II con-
tracts. Risk averse workers are forced to bear risk, but are still ex ante equally
well off because they get their reservation expected utility.13 Further, low sev-
erance payments cause a distortion in the layoff decision; firms lay off too
many workers. Hiring is also distorted compared to the first best allocation,
but the sign of the distortion is ambiguous. As we will see, publicly provided UI
programs will improve efficiency when firms cannot commit to fully insuring
their workers.
THEOREM 1: If firms offer workers type II contracts, then introducing publicly pro-
vided UI will attain the first best if the UI scheme features a full experience rating
(e , τ) = (1, 0), and full insurance b = x − r . Severance payments are completely
crowded out, s = 0.
11We will restrict the payroll tax to not discriminate on the basis of the age of a worker nor
on the basis of the sector. Adding the ability to discriminate could increase the ability of
a government to improve welfare. For example, in a second best world, reducing taxation
on old workers would induce firms to fire less workers, which might improve welfare. Not
allowing for discrimination strengthens our results.
12Because the population is not growing, various forms of the budget constraint will gen-
erate similar results.
13If workers were to earn some surplus in equilibrium, then contracts of type II would result
in a welfare loss on their part.
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Recall that firms are not able to commit to fully insuring their workers if
δ < δ¯. If the government provides full insurance b = x − r , firms would find
it in their best interest to offer pure wage contracts where s = 0, regardless of
whether they had a commitment problem or not. In general, the government
has an advantage over firms in terms of credibility. As long as people believe
in the government’s power to tax and redistribute, publicly provided UI can
improve efficiency. If UI offers full insurance, workers no longer bear risk. If
UI features a full experience rating, then the firm’s hiring and layoff decisions
are not distorted.
In fact, publicly provided UI does not have to completely crowd out sev-
erance payments to eliminate distortions in the economy. As the publicly
provided benefit b increases, the size of the severance payment s = x − r − b
necessary to provide a worker with full insurance decreases. If b is sufficiently
large, a firm with any non-zero discount rate will be able to commit to making
the payment. Let b f be the publicly provided benefit that just allows a firm14
with discount rate δ to commit to “topping off” the publicly provided benefit,
thus providing the employee with full insurance. Further, if we denote the
equilibrium profits for a given level of b by π	(b), we can implicitly define b f
with the following equation:
δ = [N
	(b f ) − n	(b f )](x − r − b f )
[N 	(b f ) − n	(b f )](x − r − b f ) + π	(b f ) − π	p w (b f )
.
COROLLARY 1: If firms offer workers type II contracts, then introducing publicly
provided UI will attain the first best if the UI scheme features a full experience rat-
ing (e , τ) = (1, 0), and a benefit b ∈ [b f , x − r ]. Severance payments are partially
crowded out when b ∈ (b f , x − r ).
So far we have assumed that the government has total freedom over the
UI system, especially concerning the level of experience rating. Outside of
the United States, experience ratings are rare, and even in the United States
the experience rating is far from one. It is not the intention in this paper to
provide justification for experience rating lower than one.15 All UI systems
with e < 1 will not be first best. Nevertheless, if firms are offering type II
contracts, publicly provided UI can be efficiency enhancing, even with an
experience rating e < 1.
COROLLARY 2: If firms offer workers type II contracts, then introducing publicly
provided UI will increase efficiency if the UI scheme features an experience rating close
to one (e , τ) ≈ (1, 0), and a benefit b ∈ [b f τ , x − r ].
14If firms have different discount factors, b f needs to be set so contracts of type I are
self-enforcing for the smallest discount factor.
15In fact, an increase in the experience rating level for e < 1 will always be efficiency
improving.
11
Suppose that the government offers a benefit b f τ generous enough that
firms can commit to “topping off” the publicly provided UI, providing workers
with full insurance. In the absence of this intervention, workers would be
exposed to risk, only partially insured by their employer. Public provision of
benefit b f τ would eliminate the inefficiency of risk averse workers bearing
risk. However, if b f τ is financed in part by payroll taxes, the UI scheme will not
achieve the first best outcome. The reason why is that the employer’s hiring
and layoff decisions will be distorted because the employer does not face the
true social costs associated with his behavior. Thus, a UI scheme financed
in part by payroll taxes may or may not increase efficiency in this model: it
eliminates the efficiency loss associated with partial insurance, but it creates
distortions in the hiring and layoff behavior of the firms. However, we know
that as e → 1, the distortions in hiring and layoffs will disappear, whereas
the benefit of full insurance remains. Thus, for values of e sufficiently close
to one, a UI scheme that would allow firms to commit to “topping off” the
publicly provided UI will increase efficiency.
The model developed above could be generalized to cover other types of
state contingent contracts, where the state is not observable by a third party.
Anytime the state is not verifiable by a third party, two choices are available if
a claim is made: honor the contract, or default. By defaulting, the insurance
provider reaps an immediate benefit. However, the insurance provider would
suffer in the future, due to a reputation effect. A contract would be self-
enforcing if the eventual losses exceed the immediate benefit of breaking
the contract. If insurance providers compete to attract clients, they will face
the incentive to reduce the size of the state contingent payment. By doing
so, the firm relaxes its incentive constraint, and is better able to compete for
clients.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: The first-order conditions are
U ′(w y ) − n(wo , s)
N (w y , s)2
Nw y (w y , s)[U (wo ) − U (r + s)] =
N (w y , s)
φ
, (A1)
U ′(wo ) + nwo (wo , s)n(wo , s) [U (wo ) − U (r + s)] =
N (w y , s)
φ
, (A2)
U ′(s + r ) + N (·)ns (·) − n(·)Ns (·)
[N (·) − n(·)]N (·) [U (wo ) − U (r + s)] =
N (·)
φ
, (A3)
U (w y ) +
[
n(·)
N (·)U (wo ) +
N (·) − n(·)
N (·) U (r + s)
]
= 2U (x), (A4)
where φ is the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint. We
can see that if w y = wo = x and s = x − r all equations are satisfied. 
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Proof of Lemma 2: The first-order conditions when severance payments are
not enforceable and firm’s discount factor is too low are
U ′
(
w IIy
) − nII
N II2
N IIw y
[
U
(
w IIo
) − U (r + s II)] = N II
φ
+ ψ
φ
N IIw y s
II, (A5)
U ′
(
w IIo
) + nIIwo
nII
[
U
(
w IIo
) − U (r + s II)] = N II
φ
− ψ
φ
nIIwo N
II
nII
s II, (A6)
U ′(s II + r ) + N ns − nNs
[N − n]N
[
U
(
w IIo
) − U (r + s II)]
= N
φ
+ ψ
φ
[
Ns − ns
N − n s + 1
]
N , (A7)
U
(
w IIy
) +
[
nII
N II
U
(
w IIo
) + N II − nII
N II
U (r + s II)
]
= 2U (x), (A8)
δ
1 − δ
[
F
(
N II
) − (w IIy )N II + pF (nII) − (w IIo )nII
− s II[N II − nII] − π	p w
] = [N II − nII]s II, (A9)
where φ is the Lagrange multiplier on the participation constraint and
ψ is the Lagrange multiplier on the self-enforcing constraint. We also
define {w IIy , w IIo , s II} as the contract that solves the system of equations,
N II = N (w IIy , s II) is the number of workers hired under this contract,
and nII = n(w IIo , s II) be the number of workers retained by firms. Using
Equations (A6) and (A7) we get:
[
U ′(s II + r ) − U ′(w IIo )] +
[
N IInIIs − nIIN IIs
(N II − nII)N II −
nIIwo
nII
] [
U
(
w IIo
) − U (r + s II)]
= ψ
φ
[
1 + N
II
s − nIIs
N II − nII s
II + n
II
wo
nII
s II
]
N II. (A10)
We can see that the right-hand side of equation above is positive if 1 +
(N IIs − nIIs )
N II − nII s +
nIIwo
nII s > 0. Because n
II
s = −nIIwo , and because of Assumption 1,
we know that the above inequality will be satisfied. If the right-hand side
of (A10) is positive, by concavity we know that w IIo > r + s II. 
Proof of Theorem 1: Under full experience rating τ = 0 and e = 1. If b =
x − r , we know that for any given δ, the contract is of type I since δ¯ = 0.
Consequently, substituting the values of b, e and τ , we get that s = 0 and
wo = w y = x. Under these conditions n	 is given by pF ′(n	) = x − b = r ,
which is efficient. Similarly, N 	 is given by F ′(N 	) = x + b = 2x − r , which
is also efficient. The contract is first best. 
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Proof of Corollary 1: The proof goes in the same line that Theorem 1, under
full experience rating τ = 0 and e = 1. For a given δ, the contract is of
type I is self-enforcing if
δ = δ¯ = [N
	(b f ) − n	(b f )](x − r − b f )
[N 	 − n	](x − r − b f ) + π	(b f ) − π	p w (b f )
.
Consequently, substituting the values of b, e and τ , we get that s = x − r −
b f and wo = w y = x. Under these conditions n	 is given by pF ′(n	) = r ,
which is efficient. Similarly, N 	 is given by F ′(N 	) = 2x − r , which is also
efficient. The contract is first best. 
Proof of Corollary 2: Suppose the public UI system has parameters (b f τ , e , τ).
A firm retains n workers: max{n} π = pF [n] − [wo + τ]n − [s + e b f τ ] ×
(N − n), where n(wo , s) solves pF ′[n(wo , s)] = wo + τ − s − e b f τ . A firm
hires N workers: max{N } π = F [N ] − (w y + τ)N + pF [n(wo , s)] −
(wo − τ)n(wo , s) − (s + e b f τ )[N − n(wo , s)], where N (w y , s) solves
F ′[N (w y , s)] = w y + τ + s + e b f τ . The firm’s profit function is π(w y ,
wo , s) = F [N (w y , s)] − (w y + τ)N (w y , s) + pF [n(wo , s)] − (wo + τ)
n(wo , s) − (s + e b f τ )[N (w y , s) − n(wo , s)]. Suppose (b f τ , e , τ) satisfies
both
δ = [N
	(b f τ ) − n	(b f τ )](x − τ − r − b f τ )
[N 	(b f τ ) − n	(b f τ )](x − τ − r − b f τ ) + π	(b f τ ) − π	p w (b f τ )
and
K[N − n]b f τ = 2τ(M − kN ) + τKN + τnK + eK[N − n]b f τ .
The first equation ensures the benefit b f τ is generous enough that
firms can commit to “topping off” the publicly provided UI, fully insuring
their workers. The second equation ensures that the government breaks
even on the UI system. If e is arbitrarily close to 1, n	 is determined by
pF ′(n	) ≈ r , which is arbitrarily close to first best. Similarly, N 	 is deter-
mined by F ′(N 	) ≈ 2x − r , which is also arbitrarily close to first best.
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